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INTRODUCTION
Over the span of thirty years, eleven women accused Frank of
rape.1 Frank’s first relevant convictions occurred in 1970.2 That year,
Frank broke into four homes over a four-month period.3 The home
invasions were “virtually identical;”4 Frank would target unsuspecting
women, follow each one to her apartment, force his way inside her
home and threaten to harm or kill her.5 He forced the women to
undress and proceeded to rape and to rob each of them.6 Frank was
arrested on sexual assault charges 7 and was indicted for sexual

1. See State v. Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d 483, 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
(“Respondent is a 67-year-old sex offender who was convicted of raping and
sodomizing four women in their homes, and accused of raping seven more women,
over 30 years ago.”).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.

2017]

DONALD DD.

869

offenses in one of the four home invasions.8 He was convicted of
burglary in the second and third degrees, robbery in the first, second,
and third degrees, and grand larceny.9 Although he was sentenced to
a maximum of twenty-five years, he only served seven.10
Upon his release in 1977, Frank committed another six home
invasions and rapes within a four-month period.11 He committed the
first invasion one month after he was discharged.12 The invasions
followed the same pattern Frank presented prior to his
incarceration.13 This time, when Frank was caught, he was convicted
of three of the rapes and convicted of the nonsexual offenses he
committed against each woman.14
Frank then spent thirty-three years in prison.15 In 2010, Frank was
up for parole once again. 16 The State of New York began a
proceeding to civilly commit Frank under New York Mental Hygiene
Law Article 10 (“Article 10”).17 Under this law, New York State has

8. These charges were dismissed before trial. See id.
9. See id. There is no public record as to why Frank was only convicted of
burglary, robbery and grand larceny or why the indicted sexual charges were
dismissed. However, ninety-four percent of state convictions result from pleabargaining. Stephanie Stern, Note, Regulating the New Gold Standard of Criminal

Justice: Confronting the Lack of Record-Keeping in the American Criminal Justice
System, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 245, 245 (2015). Thus, it is possible that Frank’s

conviction was the result of plea-bargaining.
10. Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 485 (“He received a maximum prison sentence of 25
years. He was released on parole in May 1977.”). There is no public record as to why
Frank was let out before serving his maximum sentence. A report published by the
U.S. Department of Justice in 1999 stated that “[t]he amount of time offenders serve
in prison is almost always shorter than the time they are sentenced by the court.”
PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TRUTH IN
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS (Jan. 1999), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EB8T-S3G3].
11. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 485-86.
12. See id. at 485.
13. See id. at 486 (“As before, he followed the women to their apartments, where
he raped and sodomized them. He left the women tied up or in a closet while he
burglarized their homes, fleeing with minor items.”).
14. See id. Frank was sentenced to twelve and a half to twenty-five years’
imprisonment for these crimes, but his maximum sentence became twenty-five years
to forty-six years to reflect the time not served in his prior convictions.
15. See id.
16. Frank was sixty-two years old at the time. See id.
17. See id.; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(a) (McKinney 2011) (“If the
case review team finds that a respondent is a sex offender requiring civil
management, then the attorney general may file a sex offender civil management
petition.”).
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the power to civilly commit detained sex offenders 18 who are
determined at trial to suffer from a mental abnormality that
predisposes the offender to commit another sex offense.19 At Frank’s
trial, two experts concluded that he suffered from paraphilia not
otherwise specified (“paraphilia NOS”)20 based on urges related to
non-consenting partners, and antisocial personality disorder
(“ASPD”).21 Both experts concluded that the diagnosis of paraphilia
NOS predisposed Frank to commit sexual offenses and caused him
serious difficulty in controlling his sexual impulses. 22 They also
opined that his diagnosis of ASPD hindered his volitional control,
making him predisposed to committing sexual assaults if released
again. 23 At trial, a jury found Frank suffered from a mental
abnormality and qualified for civil commitment.24 The Court placed

18. A “detained sex offender” is defined under Article 10 as a “person who is in
the care, custody, control or supervision of an agency with jurisdiction, with respect
to a sex offense or designated felony . . . .” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(g).
19. Id. § 10.07(f) (“If the court finds by a clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent has a mental abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to
commit sex offenses . . . the respondent shall be committed to a secure treatment
facility for care, treatment and control . . . .”). This type of law, typically referred to
as Sexually Violent Predator laws, has been adopted in twenty states, the District of
Columbia and by the federal government. See Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators, ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-violent-predators
[https://perma.cc/3AXL-BRWQ]; see also infra Section 1.C.
20. A paraphilia diagnosis is given when a person has “recurrent, intense sexually
arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman
objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one’s partner, or 3) children or
other nonconsenting persons that occur over a period of at least 6 months . . . .” AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERSIV-TR 566 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. “Paraphilia NOS” is used as a
category for “coding Paraphilias that do not meet the criteria for any of the specific
categories.” Id. at 576. Although the DSM-5 has split this diagnosis into two
categories, Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder and Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder,
they are similarly used as diagnoses for persons that do not meet a specific Paraphilic
disorder. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 5, 705 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]; see also Michael B. First,
DSM-5 and Paraphilic Disorders, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 191, 198 (2014).
21. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 486. A person suffers from antisocial personality
disorder when he or she presents “a pervasive patter of disregard for, and violation
of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues
into adulthood.” DSM-5, supra note 20, at 659.
22. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 487.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 488.
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Frank P. under strict intensive supervision and treatment (“SIST”),25
a form of civil commitment under Article 10.26
Nevertheless, the First Department of the New York Appellate
Division reversed the trial court’s holding. It instead held that
Frank’s condition was insufficient for civil commitment.27 The First
Department relied on the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in
State v. Donald DD.28 Donald DD. held that a diagnosis of ASPD
alone is insufficient to establish the requirement of a mental
abnormality under Article 10 29 because the diagnosis does not
distinguish the repeat sex offender from the typical recidivist.30 The
First Department dismissed the petition to civilly confine Frank
because his diagnosis of ASPD was insufficient to show he had
difficulty in controlling his behavior and therefore he was not
distinguished from the typical criminal recidivist.31 Frank was no
longer subject to SIST conditions under Article 10.32

25. See id. (“Supreme Court was persuaded by respondent’s lack of sexually
deviant behavior while incarcerated; his lack of prison disciplinary violations during
the last six years of his sentence; his ‘constructive work in prison’ to complete his
education and assist other inmates; his ‘realistic goals’ upon release; and the
continued involvement of his family and relatives in his life, to conclude that
respondent could live at liberty without reoffending if strictly supervised.”).
26. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(f) (McKinney 2011) (“If the court does not
find that the respondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, then the
court shall make a finding of disposition that the respondent is a sex offender
requiring strict and intensive supervision . . . .”).
27. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 492.
28. See id. at 485 (“This proceeding, however, preceded the recent
pronouncement by the Court of Appeals in Matter of State of New York v. Donald
DD. . . . [where] the Court of Appeals limited the evidence that can be used to civilly
commit a convicted sex offender . . . .”); State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239 (N.Y.
2014).
29. See Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d at 490-91.
30. See id. at 491 (“[W]hen the ASPD diagnosis is not accompanied by a
diagnosis of any other condition, disease or disorder alleged to constitute a mental
abnormality [it] simply does not distinguish the sex offender whose mental
abnormality subjects him to civil commitment from the typical recidivist convicted in
an ordinary criminal case.”) (quoting Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 250).
31. See id. at 493 (“[G]iven Donald DD., we find that the inferences that logically
flow from such evidence are insufficient to support a determination, under the clear
and convincing evidence standard, that respondent will have serious difficulty in
controlling his behavior . . . .”).
32. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(e) (McKinney 2011) (“If . . . the
court . . . determines that the attorney general has not sustained his or her burden of
establishing that the respondent is a detained sex offender who suffers from a mental
abnormality, the court shall dismiss the petition and the respondent shall be released
. . . .”).
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New York courts have consistently interpreted Donald DD. as
holding that a sole diagnosis of ASPD is insufficient to civilly confine
a sex offender.33 To be sure, some courts in New York have instead
stated that, under certain conditions, ASPD may be sufficient to
civilly confine a sex offender.34 This Note argues that ASPD alone
should be a condition sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender. This
is demonstrated when evaluating the purpose of Sexually Violent
Predator Laws,35 the manner in which other states have permitted
ASPD to be a sufficient diagnosis in Sexually Violent Predator
proceedings,36 and why civil commitment hearings should not proceed
under bright-line rules, but instead under an individualized
approach.37
Part I describes the development of the civil commitment of sex
offenders through Sexually Violent Predator Laws 38 and the
constitutionality of these laws under Kansas v. Hendricks 39 and
Kansas v. Crane.40 Part I then explains the New York Court of
Appeals’ decision in State v. Donald DD., which held that ASPD was
33. See State v. Richard TT., 14 N.Y.S.3d 824, 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (“The
Court of Appeals has determined that a diagnosis of ASPD, without more, does not
meet that requirement, as it ‘establishes only a general tendency toward criminality,
and has no necessary relationship to a difficulty in controlling one’s sexual
behavior.’”); State v. Raymundo V., 8 N.Y.S.3d 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (holding a
diagnosis of ASPD and alcohol dependence insufficient for civil commitment); State
v. Maurice G., 4 N.Y.S.3d 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (holding a diagnosis of ASPD and
psychopathy was not sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender because psychopathy,
like ASPD, is not a sexual disorder and does not in itself predispose one to commit a
sex offense).
34. See State v. Jerome A., No. 30261-2014, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3243, at *1718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (“This Court respectfully disagrees with the reasoning
process which the Donald DD. majority used to determine that ASPD alone cannot
serve as the predicate for a Mental Abnormality, although this Court believes there
are other valid arguments which might be advanced to support the same conclusion.
Simply because most prison inmates can be diagnosed with ASPD does not mean
most prison inmates could also be subject to Article 10 because of such a diagnosis.”)
(emphasis added); see also State v. Glenn T., 6 N.Y.S.3d 462, 465 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2015) (“[B]ased upon the determination of Donald DD., the Court must review
evidence of each particular case and those particular circumstances to make a finding
of whether or not to vacate the order based on the lack of supporting evidence to
provide for a ‘mental abnormality.’”) (emphasis added).
35. See infra Section I.C.
36. See infra Sections II.A-B.
37. See infra Part III.
38. These laws “provide a legal mechanism for the confinement of a limited
number of adult sexual offenders in a secure treatment facility after incarceration
when a court determines they are likely to engage in future acts of sexual violence.”
See ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, supra note 19, at 83.
39. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
40. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
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not a sufficient diagnosis on its own to civilly confine a sex offender
under New York’s law because of the constitutional considerations in
Kansas v. Crane.41 Part II presents a comparison of how other states
have used the diagnosis of ASPD and the holding in Kansas v. Crane
in the context of evaluating if the offender has a record to distinguish
him42 from the typical recidivist.43
Finally, Part III argues that a diagnosis of ASPD on its own should
be sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender under New York’s
Sexually Violent Predator Law.44 Part III argues that the totality of
the circumstances—an individualized approach—is better than a
bright-line rule where the law and psychology interact. This is
conveyed by evaluating the constitutional standard set out in Kansas
v. Crane, which leaves open the possibility that ASPD could be a
condition sufficient for civil commitment, by looking at subsequent
case law in New York that disagrees with the reasoning in Donald
DD., and by evaluating the purpose of civil commitment laws. Part
III also demonstrates how the totality of the circumstances approach
is already used when balancing the considerations of constitutional
rights of a citizen and the police power of the state in the Fourth
Amendment context and thus should also be used in this case.45
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND HOW IT RELATES TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIAGNOSES IN NEW YORK
Sex Offender Civil Commitment Laws have been evolving since
their inception. Part I explains the development of civil commitment
in the United States. It begins with the early forms of civil
commitment and then describes the creation of the modern civil
commitment law, the Sexually Violent Predator Law, and its
constitutionality. Part I then specifies New York’s version of the civil
commitment law, Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, and examines the
41. See infra Section I.C.2.
42. This Note will use the male pronoun to refer to sex offenders as most known
sex offenders are men. See Richard Tewksbury, Experiences and Attitudes of
Registered Female Sex Offenders, 68 FED. PROB. 30, 30 (2004) (“Studies of female
sex offenders are relatively rare, at least in part because most known sex offenders
are male.”).
43. See infra Section II.B.
44. While most states refer to their respective laws as “Sexually Violent Predator
Laws,” New York’s law was enacted as the “Sex Offender Management and
Treatment Act of 2007” and is commonly called Mental Hygiene Law Article 10.
This Note will primarily use “Mental Hygiene Law Article 10” and “Sexually Violent
Predator Law” for clarity.
45. See infra Part III.
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New York Court of Appeals' interpretation of this law in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of civil commitment
laws.
Section I.A portrays a brief history of civil commitment in the
United States of persons with mental illness who were deemed to be a
danger to society. Section I.B describes the earliest form of civil
commitment laws for sex offenders, Sexual Psychopath Laws. Section
I.C portrays the development of modern civil commitment laws for
sex offenders, the Sexually Violent Predator Laws. It also explains
the leading United States Supreme Court cases, Kansas v.
Hendricks46 and Kansas v. Crane,47 which upheld the constitutionality
of these laws. Section I.C.1 then describes New York’s Sexually
Violent Predator Law, Mental Hygiene Law Article 10.48 Section
I.C.2 finally illuminates how the New York Court of Appeals
interprets the constitutionality of Article 10 within the context of
Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane in State v. Donald DD.49
A. History of Civil Commitment in the United States
The idea of the civil commitment of persons with mental illness50
dates back to colonial times.51 Initially, there were no hospitals for
the mentally ill.52 It was primarily expected that family would take
care of those who could not conform to societal norms. 53
Nevertheless, the public feared that the burden would soon shift to
them to support those without familial help.54 The public also feared
those persons with mental illness who were deemed to pose a danger

46. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
47. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
48. See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2011).
49. See generally State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239 (N.Y. 2014).
50. The National Alliance on Mental Illness defines a mental illness as a
“condition that affects a person’s thinking, feeling or mood. Such conditions may
affect someone’s ability to relate to others and function each day. Each person will
have different experiences, even people with the same diagnosis.” Mental Health
Conditions, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/LearnMore/Mental-Health-Conditions [https://perma.cc/4AJ9-NTEU].
51. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Mental Health Law: Its History and Its Future,
20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 599 (1996).
52. See Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment–The
American Experience, 43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY RELAT. SCI. 209, 210 (2006); see also
EDWARD B. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 3 (Michael Brown et al. eds.,
1984).
53. See Joseph Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 58 AM. BAR
ASSOC. J. 1059 (1972).
54. See BEIS, supra note 52, at 3 (“Townspeople resented the itinerant poor,
fearing they would have to support them.”).
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to society.55 This led to the incarceration of those with mental health
issues.56 The “treatment” of these individuals consisted of restraint,
sedation with medications, or experimental treatments.57
This “treatment” soon proved ineffective in terms of improving
patients’ ability to live in society.58 Eventually, poor conditions, the
immense overcrowding of jails, and the concern for treatment over
restraint led to the development of psychiatric hospitals.59 The first
psychiatric admission to a facility was in Pennsylvania in 1752.60
Throughout the next century, other states followed. 61 As more
mental hospitals were built, the number of persons committed to
these facilities increased.62
In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, a shift in approach
in the treatment of the mentally ill occurred. 63 There was a
movement to develop state-supported mental hospitals with an
emphasis on “moral treatment”64 or “treatment for mental illness
based on belief that mental illness was caused by moral decay.”65 For
example, in 1845, a Massachusetts court held that Josiah Oakes’
commitment was justified because he had hallucinations and he was
engaged to a “young woman of blemished character shortly after the
death of his wife.” 66 The Court reasoned that “[t]he question
must . . . arise in each particular case, whether a patient’s own safety,
or that of others requires that he should be restrained for a certain
time and whether restraint is necessary for his restoration or will be
conducive thereto.”67 The “moral treatment” approach rooted its
justification on the principle of rehabilitation. Interestingly, persons

55. See Appelbaum, supra note 51.
56. See id.
57. Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7
PSYCHIATRY 30, 31 (2010); see also BEIS, supra note 52 (“If mentally disabled persons
were dangerous the sheriff or constable detained and forcibly restrained them . . . .
Communities took action to restrain the violent, not treat them.”).
58. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32.
59. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 209-10.
60. See id. at 210.
61. See BEIS, supra note 52, at 4 (explaining that Virginia opened its first hospital
for the mentally ill in 1773, New York authorized the commitment of the mentally
unstable in 1788, and Kentucky established the Eastern Lunatic Asylum in 1824).
62. See id.
63. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210.
64. Id.
65. JAMES MCKENZIE ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITY HEALTH 371
(7th ed. 2011).
66. BEIS, supra note 52, at 4-5.
67. Id. at 4 (quoting Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123, 125 (Mass. 1845)).
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with mental illness could be restrained whether or not they posed a
danger to society.68
When states shifted their thinking from restraint to treatment, early
forms of civil commitment laws were enacted by several states.69 This
was the first time that the care of the individual shaped state policy.70
The laws that were enacted started defining standards for involuntary
treatment.71 States are granted the power to create laws to civilly
confine individuals under two legal principles.72 The first, parens
patriae, or “father of the country,”73 allows the government to act as a
parent on behalf of individuals who cannot take care of themselves.74
In doing so, the government uses its own judgment to make decisions
for those who lack the capacity to make decisions themselves.75 The
other principle, the state’s police power, requires the government to
protect the general welfare of society. 76 This power thus grants
authority to the government to construct measures that will protect
society from individuals that may pose a danger to its security.77
Initially, family members and doctors decided whom to admit to
the state psychiatric institutions.78 The bar to admit a person was low;
there were no established procedural barriers79 and there was very
little judicial intervention.80 This made it relatively easy to civilly
commit persons “deemed” to have mental illnesses. For example, in

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id.
See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210.
See id.
See id.
See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31.
Samuel Jan Brackel, Involuntary Institutionalization, in THE MENTALLY

DISABLED AND THE LAW 24 (Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre eds., 3d ed.
1985).
74. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31.
75. See Brackel, supra note 73, at 24 (“The individual’s decisional incompetency
is thus the ‘threshold requirement’ for the state to invoke its parens patriae
authority . . . .”).
76. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31.
77. See Brackel, supra note 73, at 24 (“Rather than protect individuals from
themselves or others, the police power tends to be invoked on behalf of society or
societal interests against the individual.”).
78. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210.
79. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32 (“The standards of the day required only
that the presence of mental illness and a recommendation for treatment be
established to prove that admission of a person to a psychiatric hospital against his or
her will was necessary.”).
80. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210 (“Judicial involvement was
typically limited to endorsing medical opinions of need for treatment, and may have
also served cost control and resource allocation.”).
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1860, Elizabeth Packard’s husband civilly committed her for exploring
religions outside of the Presbyterian faith.81 When she was released
three years later, she lost custody of her children and ownership of
her property.82 The public saw involuntary commitments such as
Elizabeth Packard’s as unjust because the commitment by her
husband did not seem to fit the rehabilitative and protective purposes
of civil commitment.83
In the twentieth century, states changed these laws by placing more
regulations and restrictions on civilly committing persons with mental
illnesses. 84 For the next 100 years, reformers advocated for
procedural safeguards such as jury trials or judicial hearings. 85
Physicians were required to examine individuals and testify as to
whether or not they should be involuntarily committed to a
psychiatric institution.86 There was a focus on protecting the “right to
liberty of the person being considered for commitment.”87 While this
appeared to be a step in the right direction, problems still ensued:
persons being considered for commitment were often detained in jail
until their trial was finished and physicians often debated which
standard should be sufficient for civil commitment.88
The next shift in civil commitment reform occurred in the midtwentieth century. 89 Questions regarding the legitimacy of the
psychiatric diagnoses90 and the development of new medications91 led
81. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32.
82. See id.
83. See id.; see also Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210
(“Hospitalizations were involuntary and treatment was coerced, since it was
presumed that all mentally ill patients had compromised reason to the extent that
they were unable to request (or refuse) care on their own behalf.”).
84. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32 (“These legal protections included
potential inpatient’s right to a trial, with attorney representation . . . and the decisionmaking power was . . . placed in the hands of judges and magistrates.”).
85. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 210.
86. See id. Nevertheless, testimony by physicians could have been thwarted by
the fact that homosexual sex was still seen to be contrary to societal norms. For
example, as late as 1975, the Supreme Court ruled “there exists no right to privacy for
homosexual conduct because homosexuality had no relationship to ‘marriage, home,
or family life.’” David A. Catania, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and

Sodomy Laws: A Federal Common Law Right to Privacy for Homosexuals Based on
Customary International Law, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 295-96 (1994) (quoting Doe
v. Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975)).
87. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32.
88. See id.
89. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 211.
90. See id. (“[T]here was increased recognition that little effective treatment was
being provided in many state hospitals . . . .”).
91. See id.; see also Testa & West, supra note 57, at 33.

878

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

to an era of deinstitutionalization.92 Medications permitted patients
to live outside of psychiatric institutions.93 Thus, in the 1960s, mental
institutions were no longer seen as an effective avenue of treatment.94
If patients could survive in the community on medication, there was
no rationale for civil commitment in mental institutions.95 Moreover,
mid-twentieth century critics began to question states’ authority for
civil commitment under parens patriae and the effectiveness of the
treatment patients received.96 The focus of civil commitment started
shifting from a “need for treatment” standard to a “dangerousness”
standard.97 In other words, civil commitment required more than a
showing that the person suffered from a mental illness; the person
needed to be a danger to society or himself.
The District of Columbia began implementing the “dangerousness”
standard in 1964.98 The standard required a two-part test for a person
to be civilly committed: the person needed to have a mental illness
and needed to pose an imminent threat to himself or others.99 In
1975, the United States Supreme Court supported the idea behind the
two-requirement test in its decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson.100
The Court found the civil commitment of a man initially committed
by his father to be unconstitutional because ample evidence showed
Donaldson was not dangerous to himself or others.101 Specifically,
the Court held “a State cannot constitutionally confine without more
a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom.”102 While Donaldson’s father’s opinion would have been
sufficient in the past, here the Court increased the standard for civil
commitment by requiring a showing of some indicia that Donaldson
was dangerous.
In 1979, the Supreme Court developed another procedural
safeguard by establishing “clear and convincing evidence” as the
92. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 211; see also Testa & West, supra
note 57, at 33.
93. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 32-33.
94. See id. (“The number of psychiatric inpatients declined precipitously from a
high of more than 550,000 in 1950 to 30,000 by the 1990s.”).
95. See id. at 33 (“The medication was so effective in treating psychosis that the
idea of community-based outpatient treatment of individuals who were previously
considered to be lifelong hospital cases seemed plausible.”).
96. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 211.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 33.
100. 422 U.S. 563, 565 (1975).
101. See id. at 573.
102. Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
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burden of proof for civil commitment.103 The Court settled this issue
in Addington v. Texas.104 There, Frank O’Neal Addington claimed
that the burden of proof used to civilly commit him should not have
been the mid-level burden, clear and convincing evidence, but instead
the highest burden, beyond a reasonable doubt. 105 The Court
disagreed and held that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is to
be used when there are knowable facts. The Court reasoned:
“Psychiatric diagnosis, in contrast, is to a large extent based on
medical ‘impressions’ drawn from subjective analysis and filtered
through the experience of the diagnostician. This process often
makes it very difficult for the expert physician to offer definite
conclusions about any particular patient.”106
Thus, the Court held that the clear and convincing evidence
standard was the correct standard to use in a court proceeding dealing
with the civil commitment of a mentally ill person.107 While it may
appear that this holding made it more difficult for persons to appeal
their sentences of civil commitment, the case actually increased the
standard in some states from the lowest standard, preponderance of
the evidence.108 In doing so, it followed the twentieth century trend
of making it more difficult to civilly confine mentally ill persons while
balancing the idea that it may be impossible to civilly confine even
those people who pose a threat to the life or safety of others if the
standard of proof is too high.
More recently, policymakers have started once again to assess the
importance of the commitment of individuals who may not be
imminently dangerous but are regularly at risk to be dangerous to
others.109 The options for commitment have expanded and more
focus has been put on involuntary outpatient commitment as a “less

103. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 34. There are three levels of burden of
proof. 29 AM. JUR. 2D EVIDENCE § 173 (2016). The lowest standard, the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, requires the fact finder to “believe that
the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” Id. The middle
standard, the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, requires that the fact finder
believe a proposition is “highly probable” or have a “firm believe or conviction” that
a proposition is true. Id. The highest standard, the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard, requires the movant to prove every fact necessary to constitute the
proposition beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. § 185.
104. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
105. See id. at 421.
106. Id. at 428.
107. See id. at 432.
108. See id. at 421.
109. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 212.
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restrictive alternative.” 110
Nevertheless, the “dangerousness”
standard has inadvertently excluded those with mental illnesses who
do not present themselves to be violent while undergoing
treatment.111 This results in many mentally ill persons becoming
homeless or imprisoned.112 In doing so, the shift to “dangerousness”
has served as a speedy but ultimately ineffective long-term solution
instead of a sustainable resolution in psychiatric care.113
B.

Early Forms of Civil Commitment Laws for Sex Offenders:
Sexual Psychopath Laws

Initially, psychiatrists and lawmakers did not single out sex
offenders; they were treated the same as other groups of offenders.114
It was not until the prominence of rehabilitation 115 and, more
powerfully, an increase in the “wave of sex crimes against young
girls”116 that sex offenders started to be treated differently than other
offenders. There were five times more sex crimes reported between
the years 1933 and 1941 than were reported between the years 1921
and 1932.117 To be sure, it is possible that sex crimes did not actually
increase, but rather that past sex crimes were unreported118 or that
data was not collected regarding past sex crimes.119 Moreover, rape
laws were sex specific, requiring “a woman resist her assailant and
that there be corroborating evidence apart from that woman’s
testimony.”120 This would inevitably leave out data for one of the
most feared offenders, the child molester.121 Despite the potential

110. Id. This is considered to be less restrictive because the person is not civilly
confined in a facility.
111. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 34.
112. See id. at 35.
113. See id.
114. See Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and
Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States ,
30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 70 (2000) (explaining that sex offenders were dealt with under
laws designed to deal with “defective delinquents” and “criminal psychopaths”).
115. See id. (“This was the dawning of a new rehabilitation-focused era in the U.S.,
distinguished by a turning toward medical explanations for criminal behavior and an
orientation toward treatment goals over punishment . . . .”).
116. Tamara Rice Lave, Only Yesterday: The Rise and Fall of Twentieth Century
Sexual Psychopath Laws, 69 LA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2009).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 553 (“Even if police departments were participating, they did not
always report all of their arrests.”).
119. See id. (“The FBI could not compel police to report arrests . . . .”).
120. Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added).
121. See id. at 554 (“The FBI simply did not provide crime statistics on the most
feared form of sexual offending: child molestation.”). This could have also been
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disparities in the statistics, Americans were “outraged at what they
saw to be an increase in sex crimes and demanded that something be
done.” 122 Different solutions were recommended, 123 including
legislation designed to deal specifically with sex offenders.124
Early forms of legislation addressing sex offenders differ from
modern civil commitment laws in that the treatment for committing a
sex crime served as an alternative to a prison sentence.125 In other
words, sex offenders were either treated for the mental condition that
made them commit sex crimes or they were imprisoned for
committing those sex crimes.126 Michigan and Illinois were the first
states to pass such laws, known as Sexual Psychopath Laws.127 The
statutes required a judge to conduct a review of the sex offender and
decide if he was “feeble-minded or epileptic . . . to be psychopathic, or
a sex degenerate, or a sex pervert, with tendencies dangerous to
public safety.”128 If the judge found that the sex offender fit the
criteria, the offender would be committed to a “state hospital or
institution” until the offender was no longer a danger to society.129
Minnesota lawmakers soon followed Michigan and Illinois and the
state implemented its own Sexual Psychopath Law.130 Its statute was
the first Sexual Psychopath Law to be constitutionally interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court.131 In 1940, the Supreme Court
held in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County
that there was a rational basis for states to create laws that specify the

because early child molestation occurred within the family and these were matters
initially handled within the familial unit. This continues to occur today. See Sexual
Abuse, AMER. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Nov. 2014),
https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/FFFGuide/Child-Sexual-Abuse-009.aspx [https://perma.cc/QQ86-5DEE].
122. Lave, supra note 116, at 565.
123. See id. at 565-71 (listing some solutions such as making potential victims less
vulnerable, treating victims with more sensitivity, and tightening control of sex
offenders through increase police monitoring).
124. See id. at 571 (discussing the advent of sexual psychopath laws).
125. See Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment
Paradox, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2093, 2097 (2010) (explaining that modern sex offender
commitment statutes civilly commit sex offenders after their criminal sentence is
fulfilled).
126. See id.
127. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 71 (“Michigan and Illinois—were
in fact the first to pass these laws (1937-1938).”).
128. See Lave, supra note 116, at 571.
129. Id.
130. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 71.
131. See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Ct. of Ramsey Cty., 309 U.S. 270
(1940).
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class of sex offenders. 132 The Court reasoned that “[t]he class
[Minnesota] did select is identified by the state court in terms which
clearly show that the persons within that class constitute a dangerous
element in the community which the legislature in its discretion could
put under appropriate control.”133 Thus, laws targeting sex offenders
are constitutional.134 More than half of the other states followed
Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota. 135 These laws went relatively
uncontested by lawyers and psychologists.136
Nevertheless, Sexual Psychopath Laws that targeted sex offenders
eventually did not prove practical or popular.137 Many health experts
realized that the laws were weak in rehabilitating the individual.138 In
the legal realm, the Supreme Court struck down some of these laws
due to lack of procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and
the right to cross-examination. 139
The impracticality and
unpopularity of these laws led to the demise of more than half of
them by the mid-1980s.140
The end of the Sexual Psychopath Law era also resulted from the
minimization of the danger sex offenders posed to society.141 False
information was released that conveyed that a sex offender was no
more likely to reoffend than any other criminal offender.142 Thus, it is
no surprise that these laws were repealed, in part, because the public
was misinformed about how likely sex offenders would offend again.

132. See id. at 274-75
133. Id. at 275.
134. See id.
135. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 72.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 73.
138. See id. (“Gradually, it became clear to many mental health practitioners as
well that the scientific/medical underpinnings that supported the earlier habilitative
optimism and the laws it generated were weak indeed.”).
139. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (holding that all the
procedural safeguards of a criminal trial were warranted in this civil-type
proceeding); see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment self incrimination privilege did not extend to psychiatric examination).
140. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 73.
141. See id. at 74-75 (“One of the minimizers saw fit to implicitly criticize the
passage of Indiana’s sex offender statute as ‘the direct result of almost a mass hysteria
followed by a series of [sexually motivated] murders which occurred in the summer
and fall of 1947, as if several murders in the space of a few months in a few counties
were nothing to be alarmed about.”) (emphasis added).
142. See id. at 74 (explaining that data stating that sex offenders only get in trouble
once had been released to the public).
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Naturally, minimizing the sex offender problem did not make it go
away.143 The media eventually exposed the truth that sex offenders
still posed a bigger threat to society than the public was aware of.144
An escalation of the seriousness of offenses repeat sex offenders
committed occurred as well.145 For example, in 1989 a man named
Earl Shriner was released from a Washington prison after serving a
ten-year sentence for kidnapping and sexually assaulting two
teenagers.146 He was not eligible for civil commitment under the
original Washington Sexual Psychopath Law.147 After his release, he
raped a seven-year-old boy, cut off the boy’s penis, and left the boy to
die. 148 This escalation effect and the truth that sex offenders
continued to pose a danger to society drove the enactment of the
modern civil commitment laws, the Sexually Violent Predator
Laws.149
C. Modern form of Civil Commitment Laws for Sex Offenders:
Sexually Violent Predator Laws and the United States Supreme
Court’s Constitutional Interpretation
Sexually Violent Predator Laws differ from Sexual Psychopath
Laws in that the treatment and civil commitment of the sex offender
under Sexual Psychopath Laws occurs after a defendant has served
his prison sentence.150 Washington was the first state to pass the
modern form of sex offender civil commitment laws in 1990. 151
Today, twenty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government have adopted similar laws.152 Though each state’s law

143. See id. at 75 (“After all, minimizing a real problem does not make it go away
any more than the disappearance of a certain set of sex offender laws will cause sex
offenders to disappear.”).
144. See id.; Joan Comparet-Cassani, A Primer on the Civil Trial of a Sexually
Violent Predator, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2000) (explaining that the media
had highly publicized sexual assaults); see also Miller, supra note 125, at 2097.
145. See Comparet-Cassani, supra note 144, at 1060 (“Two of the three cases
culminated in murder, and, in each case, the offense was committed by an individual
who had an extensive prior sexual criminal history and had recently been released
from prison.”).
146. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 75.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Comparet-Cassani, supra note 144, at 1060.
150. See generally Miller, supra note 125.
151. See id. at 2097; see also Kasee Sparks, Differences in Legal and Medical
Standards in Determining Sexually Violent Predator Status, 32 L. & PSYCHOL. REV.
175, 176 (2008); supra Section I.B.
152. See ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, supra note 19 (listing
Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
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may differ in form, Washington’s preamble and statutory structure
serve as a model for comparable statutes throughout the country.153
In short, the preamble states “[t]he legislature finds that a small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators
exist . . . [and] generally have antisocial personality features which are
not amenable to existing medical illness treatment modalities and
those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent
behavior.” 154 Sexually Violent Predator Laws target repeat sex
offenders that pose a danger to society.
These laws differ from the previous sex offender laws where courts
had the choice to place sex offenders either in prison or in civil
commitment facilities. Conversely, Sexually Violent Predator Laws
continue the detainment of sex offenders who have already served
their prison sentences in civil commitment facilities. 155 In other
words, the sexual offenders first serve the time for their crime and
then are evaluated for civil commitment.156 Most states define a
“Sexually Violent Predator” in the civil commitment statutes as a
person “(1) who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually
violent offense and (2) who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder (3) that makes the person likely to engage in acts
of sexual violence.” 157 Thus, these individuals are only civilly
committed after their criminal sentence if a court deems them to have
a mental abnormality that would predispose them to be a danger to
society if released.158
Sexually Violent Predator Laws have withstood constitutional
challenges.
First, in 1997, the Supreme Court in Kansas v.
Hendricks159 evaluated Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act as it
applied to respondent Leroy Hendricks, a man with a history of

Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin as states
that have enacted Sexually Violent Predator Laws); NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N.,
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS (2012), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Sex
%20Offender%20Civil%20Commitment-April%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/53AP7EYA]; Richard L. Frierson, DSM-5 and Psychiatric Evaluations of Individuals in
the Criminal Justice System, in THE DSM-5 AND THE LAW: CHANGES AND
CHALLENGES 77 (Charles Scott ed., 2015); see also Miller, supra note 125, at 2098.
153. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 114, at 77.
154. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992).
155. See Miller, supra note 125, at 2098.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 36.
159. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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repeated child sexual molestation. 160 Hendricks, who was being
evaluated for civil commitment based on his past sexual crimes, the
most recent conviction relating to “taking ‘indecent liberties’ with two
thirteen-year-old-boys,” 161 challenged the law on substantive due
process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto claims.162 The Court held
that the act was constitutional on all grounds.163
First, the Court held that the Act’s definition of “mental
abnormality” satisfied substantive due process.164 The Act defined a
mental abnormality as a “congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person
a menace to the health and safety of others.”165 The Court explained
that while all individuals have a liberty interest, “[s]tates have in
certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible detainment of
people who are unable to control their behavior and thereby pose a
danger to the public health and safety.” 166 The Court further
reasoned these statutes must contain “proper procedures and
evidentiary standards.”167 Specifically, the Court noted it had upheld
statutes “when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the
proof of some additional factor, such as ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental
abnormality.’”168 The Court thus reasoned that because the Kansas
Act required a finding of dangerousness plus a finding that the
respondent suffered from a mental abnormality, the Act was
consistent with substantive due process and in line with similarly
constitutional laws.169 Moreover, the Court found that Hendricks’
“urge” to molest children, with the prediction of future
dangerousness laid out by the trial court made him an offender
subject to this type of proceeding.170
160. See id. at 350, 354.
161. Id. at 353.
162. See id. at 350; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5506 (West 2011).
163. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
164. See id. at 356. Substantive due process is a doctrine that requires legislation to
be “fair and reasonable in content and to further a legitimate governmental
objective.” Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
165. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West 1994).
166. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 358.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 360 (“This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a
prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other
dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through
criminal proceedings.”).
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The Court then evaluated Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post
facto claims. 171 Hendricks’ contention was that the Kansas Act
essentially constituted a second criminal punishment, thereby
establishing the double jeopardy claim.172 The Court rejected this
argument.173 First, the Court found that the language of the statute
did not warrant any other interpretation than intent to form a civil
proceeding.174 Second, the Court reasoned that the Act did not
contain the goals of retribution or deterrence,175 objectives that would
be associated with criminal punishment.176 Additionally, the Court
explained that the confinement of the mentally ill had always been
considered non-punitive detention.177 Thus, the Court found that
Kansas’ Act did not constitute double jeopardy or an ex post facto
law. This finding, along with the finding that the Act did not infringe
on substantive due process, allowed the Court to hold Kansas’ Act
constitutional.
The second time the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality
of a Sexually Violent Predator Law was in 2002. Kansas v. Crane
focused on whether or not the State must always prove that a sex
offender has complete or total lack of control of his behavior.178
There, the Supreme Court reviewed the civil commitment of Michael
Crane, a convicted sex offender who suffered from exhibitionism and
antisocial personality disorder.179 The question was whether it was
unconstitutional to civilly commit Crane when there was no showing
that he was unable to control his behavior.180 The Supreme Court
ruled that it was unconstitutional because Hendricks “underscored
171. See id.
172. See id. at 361.
173. See id.
174. See id. (“Nothing on the face of the statute suggests the legislature sought to
create anything other than a civil commitment scheme designed to protect the public
from harm.”).
175. See id. at 361-63 (stating that the Act is not retributive because it does not
assign culpability to criminal conduct and that it is not a deterrent because those
suffering from a mental abnormality are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of
confinement).
176. See id. at 361 (“[W]e will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where a
party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof’ that ‘the statutory scheme
[is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem
it ‘civil.’”) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
177. See id. at 363.
178. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).
179. See id. at 410-11.
180. See id. at 411 (“In the [Kansas Supreme Court’s] view, the Federal
Constitution as interpreted in Hendricks insists upon ‘a finding that the defendant
cannot control his dangerous behavior . . . .”).
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the constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual
offender ‘from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.’” 181
The Court further reasoned that a diagnosis of a serious mental
disorder was a way to distinguish sex offenders from other offenders
and a way to display serious difficulty in control. 182 The Court
recognized that the standard for “difficulty in control” was not a strict
standard183 but instead reasoned that
[t]he Constitution’s safeguards of human liberty in an area of mental
illness and the law are not always best enforced through precise
bright-line rules. For one thing, the states retain considerable
leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality
disorders that make an individual eligible for commitment. For
another, the science of psychiatry, which informs but does not
control ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-advancing science,
whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of law. 184

In doing so, the Court once again upheld the constitutionality of a
Sexually Violent Predator Law, but reinforced the element of
difficulty in control that is necessary to prove in order for a sex
offender to be eligible for civil commitment.

1.

New York’s Sexual Psychopath Law: New York Mental Hygiene
Law Article 10

The history of New York’s Sexually Violent Predator Law is
similar to Washington’s. On June 29, 2005, Phillip Grant murdered
Concetta Russo Carriero. Later that day he told police “he had
hidden in a stairwell with a knife for hours . . . waiting to kill.”185
Grant was a level-three sex offender 186 who had already served
twenty-three years in prison for two rape convictions and an
181. Id. at 412 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360).
182. See id. at 412-13 (“The presence of what the ‘psychiatric profession itself
classified . . . as a serious mental disorder’ helped to make [the distinction between
civil commitment and retribution] in Hendricks. And a critical distinguishing feature
of that ‘serious . . . disorder there consisted of a special and serious lack of ability to
control behavior.”).
183. See id. at 413 (explaining that difficulty in control will not be “demonstrable
with mathematical precision,” but must be enough to distinguish the sex offender
from the typical recidivist).
184. Id. at 407-08.
185. Anahad O’Connor, Homeless Man Goes on Trial in Hate-Crime Murder,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/13/nyregion/homelessman-goes-on-trial-in-hatecrime-murder.html [https://perma.cc/8FHE-4N8G].
186. A level-three sex offender in New York State designates that the “risk of
repeat offense is high and there exists a threat to public safety.” N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 168-l(6)(c) (McKinney 2000).
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attempted sexual assault conviction.187 Similarly to the people of
Washington State, the people of New York State feared this kind of
escalation from offenders who had already served their time. This
resulted in Governor Pataki’s call for legislation called “Concetta’s
Law,” intended to serve a similar function to the Sexually Violent
Predator Laws described above. 188 When the New York State
Assembly and Senate were unable to agree on the legislation,
Governor Pataki sought to have offenders civilly committed under
Mental Hygiene Law Section 9.27.189 Mental Hygiene Law Section
9.27(a) allows a director of a hospital to receive “any person alleged
to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary care and treatment upon
the certificates of two examining physicians, accompanied by an
application for the admission of such person.”190 Mental Hygiene
Law Section 9.27(b) provides eleven options by which the patient can
be admitted by application, only one of which requires a court
order.191 In this way, sex offenders can be civilly committed without
judicial involvement and without relying on the mentally abnormality
plus dangerousness requirements in other statutes.192
Not long after Governor Pataki ordered the use of Mental Hygiene
Law Section 9.27 to civilly commit sex offenders, the initiative193 was
challenged on procedural grounds.194 In November 2005, the New
York Court of Appeals held that it was improper to use Mental
Hygiene Law Section 9.27 to involuntarily commit sex offenders
because the law did not specifically permit the release of felony
offenders from prison to a mental health institution.195 It ruled that

187. See N.Y. ST. OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10: SEX OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT OF 2007 3 (2009), https://www.omh.ny.gov/
omhweb/resources/publications/2008_SOMTA_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z75HP284].
188. Id.
189. See id. (“New York State was fairly unique in its attempt to [civilly commit
sex offenders] through a pre-existing statute”); see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
9.27 (McKinney 2007) (allowing the civil commitment of persons with mental illness
upon authorization of two physicians).
190. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a) (McKinney 2011).
191. See id. § 9.27(b).
192. See N.Y. ST. OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 187.
193. See id. at 3. (“The Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) initiative in New York
State commenced in September 2005. Under this initiative, OMH was required to
conduct a comprehensive record review of all sex offenders who were scheduled for
release from DOCS.”).
194. State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 859 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter
Harkavy I].
195. Id.
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Correction Law Section 402 196 should have been used to civilly
confine sex offenders instead. 197 Correction Law Section 402
provides treatment for individuals already imprisoned and already
psychiatrically evaluated.198 The Court of Appeals ruled that it was
this law that provided the appropriate evaluation for sex offenders
requiring civil commitment.199 Pending the outcome of the second
appeal in that case, the New York Legislature passed the Sex
Offender Management and Treatment Act.200
The Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act is enumerated
in Chapter 7 of the Laws of 2007.201 Commonly referred to as Article
10, the Act dictates the process for civil commitment in New York.202
Its focus is “to enhance public safety by continuing to treat and
manage mentally abnormal sex offenders who are being released
from some type of supervision . . . but remain predisposed to
recidivate in the absence of such treatment and management.”203
Thus, it is similar to other Sexually Violent Predator Laws in that its
goal is to protect society from sex offenders prone to recidivism by
keeping them in civil confinement after the fulfillment of their prison
sentences.
The first part of the statute presents legislative findings, mainly,
“[t]hat recidivistic sex offenders pose a danger to society that should
be addressed through comprehensive programs of treatment and
management.”204 Moreover, the legislature found that “some sex
offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them to engage
in repeat sex offenses.”205 Thus, the law sets out to protect the
community from sex offenders that are diagnosed with mental
abnormalities that make it difficult to control reoffending or
escalating.
In order for a sex offender to be eligible for civil commitment
under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, a case review team reviews a

196. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 402 (McKinney 2014).
197. Harkavy I, 859 N.E.2d at 509 (“[W]e hold that the procedures set forth in
Correction law § 402, rather than Mental Hygiene Law article 9, better suit this
situation.”).
198. Id. at 511.
199. Id. at 511-12.
200. See N.Y. ST. OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 187, at 4.
201. It was effective April 13, 2007. See id. at 5.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2011).
205. Id. § 10.01(b).
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detained sex offender’s file206 to see if he is a “dangerous sex offender
requiring confinement.” 207 The statute defines a “dangerous sex
offender requiring confinement” as a person
who is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental abnormality
involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and
such an inability to control behavior, that the person is likely to be a
danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a
secure treatment facility.208

A “detained sex offender” is a person in the “care, custody, control
or supervision of an agency with jurisdiction” that either is convicted
or charged with a sex offense or convicted of a designated felony that
was sexually motivated.209 Finally, a “mental abnormality” is defined
as a “congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects
the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a
manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct
constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having
serious difficulty in controlling such conduct.”210 Thus, in order for a
person to require civil management, the person must be a “detained
sex offender” and have a “mental abnormality” as defined by the
statute.
Once it is determined that the “respondent”211 is a sex offender
requiring civil management, the case review team refers the case to
the New York Attorney General, who may file a sex offender civil
commitment petition in a court with jurisdiction over where the
respondent is located. 212 The petition must allege facts “of an
evidentiary character tending to support the allegation that the
respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.”213 There is
then a probable cause hearing where the court determines whether

206. Id. § 10.05(e) (“[T]he case review team shall review relevant records . . . and
may arrange for a psychiatric examination of the respondent. Based on the review
and assessment of such information, the case review team shall consider whether the
respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.”).
207. Confinement and management are often used interchangeably with
commitment. This Note uses commitment for consistency purposes.
208. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (McKinney 2016).
209. Id. § 10.03(g).
210. Id. § 10.03(i).
211. Id. § 10.03(n) (defined as “a person referred to the case review team for
evaluation, a person as to whom a sex offender civil management petition has been
recommended by a case review team and not yet filed, or filed by the attorney
general and not dismissed, or sustained by procedures under this article.”).
212. Id. § 10.06(a).
213. Id.
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the respondent is such an offender.214 If the court determines that
there is no probable cause, the petition is dismissed.215 If the court
determines there is probable cause, the court orders the respondent
to a secure treatment facility216 and sets a date for trial.217 The
respondent will not be released until the end of the trial.218
A trial must begin within sixty days of the court determining there
is probable cause that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil
management.219 The jury or judge220 must determine by clear and
convincing evidence 221 whether the respondent is a detained sex
offender who suffers from a mental abnormality.222 If the jury or
court determines that the respondent is not a sex offender who suffers
from a mental abnormality by clear and convincing evidence, the
petition is dismissed and the respondent is released.223 If the jury or
court determines that the respondent is a sex offender who suffers
from a mental abnormality, the court shall then consider whether the
respondent is a “dangerous sex offender requiring confinement or a
sex offender requiring strict and intensive supervision.”224 That is, the
court will decide if the sex offender needs to be committed into a
facility or can be released into the community under close monitoring
and strict supervision.
The court will determine that the respondent is a sex offender
requiring commitment if it finds by a clear and convincing evidence
that “respondent has a mental abnormality involving such a strong
predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control
behavior, that the respondent is likely to be a danger to others and to
commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility.”225
If the court does not find this, then the respondent will be a “sex

214. Id. § 10.06(g).
215. Id. § 10.06(k).
216. If the respondent or respondent’s counsel signs a consent to remain in the
prison which he already resides, he may stay there until the end of the trial. See id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Id. § 10.07(a).
220. The court may make the determination at trial if a jury trial is waived. See id.
§ 10.07(c).
221. The burden of proof rests on the attorney general. See id. § 10.07(d); see also
Testa & West, supra note 57, at 34.
222. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011).
223. Id. § 10.07(e).
224. Id. § 10.07(f).
225. See id.; see also id. § 10.10(a) (“[T]hat facility shall provide care, treatment
and control of the respondent until such time that a court discharges the respondent
in accordance with the provisions of this article”).
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offender requiring strict and intensive supervision.”226 This means
that the respondent is released, but is closely monitored in the
community.227
The respondent may petition for release on an annual basis.228
When this occurs, there is an evidentiary hearing to decide whether or
not the respondent still suffers from a mental abnormality and still
requires civil commitment.229 If the court decides the respondent no
longer suffers from a mental abnormality and no longer requires civil
commitment, the court shall issue an order that discharges the
respondent to strict intensive supervision and treatment.230 Likewise,
the respondent may also petition for discharge on strict intensive
supervision and treatment. If the court finds respondent no longer
requires civil commitment, it shall order the respondent’s
discharge.231

2.

The New York Court of Appeals’ Interpretation of Article 10
and Its Constitutionality In Relation to Antisocial Personality
Disorder

Upon the passing of Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, the New
York Court of Appeals ruled that any respondent’s challenge to
transfer to a secure facility under Article 9 had “been rendered
academic.”232 Article 10 is now the law under which New York courts
determine whether sex offenders require civil commitment once they
near the end of their prison sentences.233 Recently, and in light of
Kansas v. Crane, the constitutionality of Article 10 was challenged.234
On July 26, 2002, eighteen-year-old Donald DD. had sexual

226. Id. § 10.07(f); see also id. § 10.11(a) (explaining the supervision requirements
may include but are not limited to “electronic monitoring or global positioning
satellite tracking for an appropriate period of time, polygraph monitoring,
specification of residence or type of residence, prohibition of contact with identified
past or potential victims, strict and intensive supervision by a parole officer, and any
other lawful and necessary conditions that may be imposed by a court”).
227. See id. § 10.11.
228. Id. § 10.09(a) (“The commissioner shall provide the respondent and counsel
for the respondent with an annual written notice of the right to petition the court for
discharge.”).
229. Id. § 10.09(h).
230. Id.
231. Id. § 10.11(h).
232. State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 870 N.E.2d 128, 132 (N.Y. 2007)
[hereinafter Harkavy II.].
233. See id. (stating that this included those who are petitioners in Harkavy II.).
234. State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239 (N.Y. 2014).
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intercourse with a fourteen-year-old acquaintance.235 Afterwards, he
asked the acquaintance if he could have intercourse with her twelveyear-old cousin.236 The twelve-year-old was afraid and did not resist
when Donald partially inserted his penis into her vagina.237 Donald
pled guilty to rape in the second-degree,238 attempted rape in the
second degree, and endangering the welfare of a child.239 He was
convicted and sentenced to six months in prison and ten years
probation in January 2004.240
In the same year he was released,241 Donald persuaded a young
woman to walk with him 242 and then forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him.243 Donald was subsequently arrested and pled
guilty to sexual abuse in the second degree.244 He again served six
months in prison, was released, but again was arrested for throwing
rocks at an acquaintance’s car and injuring a passenger.245 This time,
he was resentenced and convicted to one to three years of
imprisonment.246
A year later, Donald’s prison sentence was coming to an end, and
he was evaluated for civil commitment under Article 10. 247
Nevertheless, upon review, a psychiatric examiner testified that he did
not believe Donald suffered from a mental abnormality within the
meaning of Mental Hygiene Law Section 10.03.248 Thus, he was

235. See id. at 243.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Id.; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30(1) (McKinney 2009) (“[B]eing 18 years
old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than 15
years old.”).
239. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 243.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 244 (“On July 1, 2004, after release from prison, Donald DD.
persuaded a young woman, a close friend of his wife, to accompany him on a walk to
a local cemetery. There, he kissed the woman and, ignoring her repeated protests,
had sexual intercourse with her.”).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.60 (McKinney 2009).
245. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 244 (“Donald DD.’s probation was revoked in the
summer of 2006, after he was arrested following an incident in which he threw stones
or rocks at an acquaintance’s car, injuring a passenger.”).
246. See id.
247. It was then 2008; Donald DD. had not been evaluated under the law prior to
this was because MHL Article 10 was not enacted until 2007. See N.Y. ST. OFF. OF
MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 187, at 5.
248. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 244 (“A psychiatric examiner, Dr. Mark
Cederbaum, opined that Donald DD. suffered from ASPD, but did not have a mental
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conditionally released to parole.249 His parole terms indicated that he
could not contact anyone under eighteen without the presence of an
adult.250 Nevertheless, his children alleged that he was alone with
them and he “had touched their ‘privates’ and encouraged them to
touch each other’s and his ‘privates.’”251 His parole was thus revoked
and he was returned to prison to serve the remainder of his 2007
maximum sentence. 252 In June 2009, another civil commitment
proceeding began against Donald as he was nearing the end of his
sentence.253 Donald was committed to a secure treatment facility
after the court found probable cause that he was a sex offender
requiring civil commitment.254 A jury trial began in March 2010.255
At trial, the State presented two psychologists who testified that
Donald suffered from antisocial personality disorder. 256 The
psychologists testified that this disorder resulted in a pattern of
disregard for others and disregard for the law.257 One psychologist
believed Donald suffered from all seven traits listed under the ASPD
diagnosis and the other believed he suffered from at least six.258
Nevertheless, one of the psychologists testified that “a very small
portion of individuals with antisocial personality disorders . . . are
actually incarcerated for a sexual offense.” 259 He testified that
approximately seven percent of those diagnosed with ASPD are
probably incarcerated for a sexual offense because “[s]ome with
antisocial personality disorder commit sex offenses and some
don’t.” 260 That same doctor believed that in Donald’s case, his
diagnosis of ASPD predisposed him to commit sex offenses and

abnormality within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(i).”) (emphasis in
original).
249. See id. (“Donald DD. was conditionally released to parole supervision in June
2008.”).
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id. (“The State presented two licensed psychologists, Dr. Christopher
Kunkle and Dr. Richard Hamill, as witnesses, both of whom had interviewed Donald
DD. and reviewed his records.”).
257. See id. (“[They both] opined that Donald DD. suffered from ASPD . . . .
[and] . . . described the disorder as ‘characterized by a pervasive pattern of disregard
for others and violation of the law.’”).
258. See id. at 245.
259. See id.
260. Id.
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caused him to have “serious difficulty in controlling his sex-offending
conduct.”261 The other psychologist testified similarly, stating, “the
large majority, 93 percent of those diagnoses with [ASPD], are not
sex offenders.”262 He then similarly stated that ASPD predisposed
Donald to engage in conduct constituting a sex offense and resulting
in his serious difficulty in controlling his sex-offending conduct.263
The psychologists’ statements support the idea that ASPD can
manifest in many ways, and in Donald’s case, their opinion was that it
manifested as an uncontrollable impulse that made it safer to confine
him to protect himself and others.
The State called a third psychologist as a witness.264 This doctor
testified that Donald was an opportunistic offender.265 He stated that
the ASPD diagnosis was not specific to one’s sexual impulses.266 He
stated, “I would say the vast majority of individuals in all the state
prisons in this state could be diagnosed with antisocial personality
disorder. By definition they all have difficulty conforming their
behavior to the law.”267 Thus, the third psychologist’s testimony
reflected the opinion that Donald’s ASPD did not qualify him as a sex
offender requiring civil commitment under Article 10.268
The jury at trial found that Donald had a “condition, disease or
disorder that predisposed him to the commission of conduct
constituting a sex offense and result[ed] in his having serious difficulty
in controlling such conduct.”269 Donald then moved to set aside the

261. Id. (“In [Donald DD.’s] case, his disorder predisposes him in a way because
his behavior has shown you that. His behavior has shown you what goes on inside his
mind, and he acts upon the urges that he has . . . he acts upon that urge and neglects
the laws that govern.”).
262. Id.
263. See id. (“[H]e opined that ASPD predisposed Donald DD. to engage in
conduct constituting a sex offense . . . .[and] . . . that Donald DD.’s ASPD resulted in
his having serious difficulty in controlling his sexual-offending conduct.”).
264. See id.
265. See id. at 246.
266. Id. (“He explained that ASPD can act ‘in combination with . . . a diagnosable
sexual disorder, and . . . can add extra fuel to the fire, if you will,’ but cannot ‘in and
of itself . . . predict sexual impulse control.’”).
267. See id.
268. Differing opinions between mental health professionals regarding ASPD are
not uncommon. See Kathleen Wayland & Sean D. O’Brien, Deconstructing

Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy: A Guidelines-Based Approach to
Prejudicial Psychiatric Labels, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 519, 542 (2013) (“[T]he diagnosis

of ASPD specifically . . . [has] been the subject of multiple critiques and debate, and
these issues are not settled in the mental health field.”).
269. See Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 246; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 10.03(i) (McKinney 2016).
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verdict, but this was denied.270 Donald grounded his argument in the
fact that “ASPD is an inapplicable predicate for a finding of mental
abnormality because it is ‘not a sexual disorder.’” 271 The Court
denied the motion and ordered Donald to be civilly confined.272
Donald appealed,273 but the Appellate Division affirmed, holding, “a
mental condition need not itself have any sexual component in order
to predispose a person to the commission of conduct constituting a
sex offense and result in that person’s having serious difficulty in
controlling such conduct.”274 Donald appealed again to the New
York Court of Appeals. 275
The Court of Appeals reversed the Supreme Court and Appellate
Division’s decisions.276 It focused on the constitutionality of civilly
confining a sex offender based on the diagnosis of ASPD.277 The
Court referred to Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane when
evaluating Donald’s claim that a diagnosis of ASPD was insufficient
to civilly confine a sex offender.278 The Court emphasized that in
both cases, the United States Supreme Court explained that the
mental abnormality the sex offender is suffering from must
distinguish him “from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in
an ordinary criminal case.” 279 This distinction is important in
ensuring civil commitment does not act as a device for punitive
measures or deterrence.280 The Court of Appeals held, based on the
constitutional requirements set by Hendricks and Crane as well as the
statistics281 of those in the prison population suffering from ASPD,
that ASPD alone “simply does not distinguish the sex offender whose
mental abnormality subjects him to civil commitment from the typical

270. See Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 246.
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. See id. (“Donald DD. appealed, again challenging the use of ASPD as a basis
for the jury’s finding of mental abnormality.”).
274. See id.
275. See id. at 247.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 249.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 250 (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)).
280. Id. at 249.
281. See id. (explaining that one of the psychologist’s testimony in the Kenneth T.
case stated that around eighty percent of the people currently in prison suffer from
ASPD); see also supra notes 259-62.

2017]

DONALD DD.

897

recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”282 Thus, the Court
of Appeals held that Donald’s ASPD diagnosis and evidence of sex
crimes was not sufficient for Donald to be subject to civil confinement
if there was no other independent mental abnormality diagnosis to go
along with it.283 Thirteen sex offenders have since been released
pursuant to the decision in Donald DD.284
II. ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER AND DISTINGUISHING
THE SEX OFFENDER FROM THE TYPICAL CRIMINAL RECIDIVIST
Part II describes the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. It
also illuminates the manner in which different jurisdictions have used
the diagnosis in evaluating respondents under Sexually Violent
Predator Laws. Though not many jurisdictions have been as explicit
as New York regarding the diagnosis’ sufficiency for civil
commitment, some jurisdictions permit the use of ASPD alone as a
condition sufficient for civil commitment. Most jurisdictions that
have had the opportunity to evaluate the sufficiency of ASPD for civil
commitment permit it, so long as there is other evidence that the
respondents’ diagnosis supports his propensity to commit sexually
violent offenses.285 Section II.A provides an explanation of how

282. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 249-50 (“We must interpret the Mental Hygiene
Law article 10 statute on the assumption that it accords with these constitutional
requirements.”).
283. Id. at 251. During the pendency of writing this Note, the New York Court of
Appeals decided State v. Dennis K., which again addressed the sufficiency of a
diagnosis of ASPD to constitute mental abnormality under Article 10. 59 N.E.3d 500
(N.Y. 2016). In sum and substance, the case clarified that Donald DD. did not
require that a sex offender suffer from a sexual disorder. See id. at 517. Moreover,
the case declared that sex offenders who are diagnosed with ASPD and some other
disorder may be eligible for civil commitment. See id. at 521. Dennis K. does not
affect the argument of this Note.
284. Associated Press, NY frees “antisocial personality disorder” sex offenders,
ONEIDA DAILY DISPATCH (June 1, 2015), http://www.oneidadispatch.com/
article/OD/20150601/NEWS/150609993 [https://perma.cc/ZYV9-FV8D].
285. The analysis in this Part focuses on jurisdictions that have been explicit in
evaluating antisocial personality disorder under Hendricks and Crane. While there
may be more cases and jurisdictions that implicitly accept or reject ASPD as a
sufficient condition for a mental abnormality, the focus on those that are explicit is
done for clarity. For example, the Supreme Court of California published a decision,
People v. Williams, which affirmed a judgment that civilly committed a sex offender
who was diagnosed with “psychosis, paranoia and severe antisocial personality
disorder.” 74 P.3d 779, 792-93 (Cal. 2003). Although the California Supreme Court
implicitly ASPD as a condition sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender, it also came
to this conclusion based on the other diagnoses, psychosis and paranoia.
Furthermore, it did not make any explicit statement that ASPD could be a condition
sufficient for civil commitment. Thus, in order to avoid making broad generalizations
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ASPD and psychological diagnoses are used in civil commitment
proceedings. Section II.B discusses how different jurisdictions286 use
the diagnosis of ASPD when evaluating a sex offender under a
Sexually Violent Predator Law.
A. Antisocial Personality Disorder: Its Definition and its Relation
to the Law
Antisocial personality disorder is defined in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5 (“DSM-5”) as “a pervasive
pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that
begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into
adulthood.” 287 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM”) “defines and classifies mental disorders in order
to improve diagnoses, treatment, and research.”288 The DSM has
been “widely accepted and relied on in both civil and criminal
proceedings.”289 Mental health practitioners usually use the DSM to
determine if a person has a certain diagnosis under the applicable
law.290
Nevertheless, there is criticism as to how much courts should rely
on the DSM in legal proceedings.291 In the most recent edition, DSM5, there is a cautionary note for forensic use. It recognizes that the
DSM is used for forensic purposes but warns that no diagnosis under
the DSM implies that a condition meets any legal criteria. The
cautionary statement explains that this is a result of “the imperfect fit
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the
information contained in a clinical diagnosis.”292 A Nevada Supreme
Court case, Dodd v. Hughes, explained that “[t]he judicial inquiry is

about jurisdictions’ views on ASPD and civil commitment, this Note will use cases
that are explicit in their findings.
286. Specifically, this Part will focus on decisions published by the highest court in
each state. While opinions regarding this issue may differ among lower courts in each
state, this Note focuses on the highest court in each state because “[a] state court of
last resort is the ultimate judicial arbiter of the interpretation and application of the
laws of that state.” See TONI JAEGER-FINE, AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
RESOURCE AND REFERENCE GUIDE 49 (Lexis Nexis ed., 2d ed. 2015).
287. See DSM-5, supra note 20, at 659.
288. About DSM-5:
Development of DSM-5, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/about-dsm
[https://perma.cc/WQ2N-3HTG].
289. Jessica Ferranti, DSM-5: Development and Implementation, in THE DSM-5
AND THE LAW: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 18 (Charles Scott ed., 2015).
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See DSM-5, supra note 20, at 25.

2017]

DONALD DD.

899

not to be limited so as to exclude the totality of circumstances
involved in the particular case before the court”293 when evaluating
the significance of medical testimony in relation to a DSM
diagnosis.294 The United States Supreme Court later opined similarly
of the risks of the trier of fact misapplying testimony of medical
experts in Clark v. Arizona. 295 Thus, the Court advised that
psychiatric diagnoses in the DSM should be used in conjunction with
the totality of the circumstances of a particular case.296
Although the Supreme Court ruled in Hendricks that a DSM
diagnosis is not necessary or sufficient to show a respondent suffers
from a mental abnormality,297 courts and expert witnesses often use
the DSM as a reference when diagnosing sexually violent
predators. 298 In determining if a person suffers from ASPD,
psychologists and psychiatrists look for a repetitive pattern of
behavior in which a person violates the basic rights of others.299
Significantly, a feature associated with ASPD is that those diagnosed
with the disorder “may engage in sexual behavior . . . that has a high
risk for harmful consequences.”300 Though some cases analyzed in
this Note will have used the DSM-IV and the DSM-IV-TR—previous
editions of the DSM—the definition of ASPD has not changed in
substance in the transition to the DSM-5.301

293. Dodd v. Hughes, 398 P.2d 540, 542 (Nev. 1965).
294. See Ferranti, supra note 289, at 19.
295. 548 U.S. 735, 778 (2006) (“[E]mpirical and conceptual problems add up to a
real risk that an expert’s judgment in giving capacity evidence will come with an
apparent authority that psychologists and psychiatrists do not claim to have.”).
296. This is important in the context of Donald DD., where it may be argued that
the New York Court of Appeals did not use the totality of the circumstances in
conjunction with the DSM diagnosis, ASPD. This Part shows that jurisdictions have
used the totality of the circumstances presented in individual cases along with the
DSM diagnosis of ASPD and have concluded that a sex offender should be subject to
civil commitment.
297. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (“Legal definitions . . . must
‘take into account such issues as individual responsibility . . . and competency,’ [but]
need not mirror those advanced by the medical profession.”).
298. See Frierson, supra note 152, at 86 (“Prior to DSM-5’s release, DSM-IV-TR
paraphilias were some of the most common mental disorders noted to impair an
individual’s ability to control their sexual behavior.”).
299. See DSM-5, supra note 20, at 659.
300. Id. at 660.
301. Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 20, at 701 (“The essential feature of
Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation
of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues
into adulthood.”), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-IV 645 (4th ed. 1994) (“The essential feature of
Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation
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Jurisdictional Analysis of ASPD as a Condition Sufficient under
Sexually Violent Predator Laws

Jurisdictions continue to use ASPD as a condition sufficient to
civilly commit a sex offender even after the finding that the sex
offender needs to be distinguished from the typical criminal recidivist.
Generally, jurisdictions require some evidence in addition to ASPD,
such as a past record of repeat sexual offenses, to support the
diagnosis under the Sexually Violent Predator Laws.

1.

Iowa: Individual Inquiry

The State of Iowa accepts the use of ASPD as a condition sufficient
for civil commitment so long as all other components of the Sexually
Violent Predator Law are met.
In doing so, Iowa uses an
individualized inquiry to evaluate whether a specific offender’s
diagnosis of ASPD makes him prone to committing sexually violent
offenses if not civilly confined.
Iowa permits the diagnosis of ASPD to be a condition sufficient
under Iowa’s Sexually Violent Predator Act so long as “all elements
of the statute are met.”302 Iowa’s Sexually Violent Predator Act
requires a finding that a respondent was “convicted of or charged
with a sexually violent offense” and that he “suffers from a mental
abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory
acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure
facility.”303 Thus, so long the diagnosis makes an offender likely to
engage in sexually violent acts, ASPD may be used in Iowa as a
condition sufficient for civil commitment.
In In re Detention of Barnes, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the
contention that ASPD “renders the statute overly broad and violates
due process.”304 The Court evaluated Allen Albert Barnes under
Iowa’s Sexually Violent Predator Act and under Kansas v. Crane.305
At thirteen, Barnes sexually molested his nephew.306 In 1981 he
committed voyeurism.307 In 1985, Barnes was convicted of three
of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues
into adulthood.”) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
302. In re Det. of Hodges, 689 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 2004). See also In re Det. of
Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Iowa 2004).
303. IOWA CODE § 229A.2(1211) (2015).
304. In re Barnes, 689 N.W.2d at 456.
305. Id. at 457-60.
306. Id. at 456.
307. Id.; see also IOWA CODE § 709.21 (2008) (defining voyeurism as when “[a]
person . . . knowingly views, photographs, or films another person, for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person . . . [and] . . . (a) the other
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counts of third-degree sexual abuse and imprisoned until 1990 for
raping three different women at knifepoint.308 In 1996, Barnes was
convicted of third degree sexual abuse when he forced his way into a
woman’s home and raped her.309 In 2001, when his prison sentence
was coming to an end, the State of Iowa filed a petition to civilly
confine Barnes.310
Barnes argued that he could not be civilly committed under his
diagnosis of ASPD because “this diagnosis is not correlated with sexoffending and . . . forty to sixty percent of the prison population has
this diagnosis.”311 He also argued that this diagnosis did not indicate
whether or not he had difficulty in controlling himself from
committing a future offense.312 The Iowa Supreme Court rejected
these arguments. First, the Court reasoned that the statute does not
require “that the condition affect the emotional or volitional capacity
of every person who is afflicted with the disorder or condition; the
requirement is that it has that effect on the particular individual
subject to commitment.”313 The Court deferred to the trial court in
holding that Barnes’ ASPD constituted a mental abnormality under
the statute.314 Second, the Court reasoned that the statute did not
require the mental abnormality to be specific toward sexual
offenses.315 In so ruling, the Court pronounced: “We think this
individualized inquiry comports with the requirements of due process
because it ultimately serves to limit civil commitment to dangerous
sexual offenders. At the same time, it protects those persons inflicted
with antisocial personality disorder who are not predisposed to
commit sexual offenses from commitment.”316
Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the civil commitment of
Barnes using the individualized inquiry of how Barnes’ ASPD
affected him in the context of committing sex offenses. Iowa has
person does not have knowledge about and does not consent or is unable to consent
to being viewed, photographed, or filmed, (b) the other person is in a state of full or
partial nudity, [and] (c) the other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
while in a state of full or partial nudity.”).
308. In re Barnes, 689 N.W.2d at 456.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 457.
311. Id. at 458. This argument was successful in Donald DD., but was not
successful in Iowa. See State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 245 (N.Y. 2014).
312. In re Barnes, 689 N.W.2d at 458.
313. Id. at 459.
314. Id. (“[W]e frequently defer to the district court’s judgment in such cases
because it was in a better position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.”).
315. Id. at 460.
316. Id.
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consistently evaluated ASPD in this way under its Sexually Violent
Predator Act.317

2.

Kansas: Individual Inquiry

ASPD is also allowed as a condition sufficient under Kansas’
Sexually Violent Predator Law. The State of Kansas uses an
individualized inquiry similar to the one Iowa follows. Importantly,
the language of Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Statute was the
same language the Supreme Court evaluated in Kansas v. Crane—the
case that the New York Court of Appeals in Donald DD. used to
determine that ASPD alone is insufficient for civil commitment. The
Kansas Supreme Court has focused on the language of whether or not
the mental abnormality “makes him or her likely to engage in repeat
acts of sexual violence, such that he or she or the acts pose ‘a menace
to the health and safety of others.’”318 If the respondent’s mental
abnormality satisfies that language, the respondent is subject to civil
commitment.
Richard A. Miller appealed his order of civil commitment based on
multiple claims.319 Relevant to the ASPD inquiry, Miller claimed that
he could not be civilly committed because he was never diagnosed
with a disorder that was specific to a sex-related abnormality.320
Miller was a repeat sex offender321 that was diagnosed with ASPD.322

317. See e.g., Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Linn Cty., 879 N.W.2d 634, 639 n.1 (Iowa
2016) (citing In re Barnes, 689 N.W.2d at 459-60) (“We note that we have determined
that antisocial personality disorder may be a sufficient mental abnormality on its own
to support civil commitment if it affects the individual person’s likelihood to commit
a sexually violent offense, a determination made in an individualized inquiry.”); In re
Det. of Altman, 723 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Iowa 2006) (affirming the civil commitment of
Altman based on the expert testimony that his ASPD made it more likely than not
that he would commit a sex offense in the future); In re Det. of Hodges, 689 N.W.2d
467, 470 (Iowa 2004) (“Although Hodges could not be committed solely because of
his antisocial personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder can serve as the
mental abnormality upon which commitment is based so long as all the elements of
the statute are met . . . .”).
318. In re Miller, 210 P.3d 625, 634 (Kan. 2009) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5929a02(b) (1994)).
319. Id. at 628 (“He argues that the district judge erred in denying his motion to
stipulate to a prior sex crime case; erred in admitting evidence of other prior crimes
or civil wrongs, including those that had no sexual component or had never been
proved; and erred in entering judgment after a jury verdict that he qualified as a
sexually violent predator under the Act when he had never been diagnosed with a
sex-related abnormality or disorder. Miller also advances a cumulative error
argument.”).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 628-29.
322. Id. at 629.
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He claimed that that disorder alone did not distinguish him from the
dangerous typical recidivist.323 Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme
Court maintained that the “language of the statute is clear” and “does
not narrowly define mental abnormality as a sex-related disorder. It
provides for the commitment of a sex offender with any mental
abnormality . . . that makes him or her more likely to engage in repeat
acts of sexual violence . . . .”324 Thus, Miller’s civil commitment was
upheld. However, the Court made it clear that “[n]ot every sex
offender whose diagnosis matches Miller’s will necessarily qualify as a
sexually violent predator under the Act, but Miller received all the
process due to him under the Act and the federal Constitution.”325 In
doing so, the Kansas Supreme Court emphasized that an individual
inquiry is best suited for sex offenders that are diagnosed with ASPD.

3.

Minnesota: Individual Inquiry

Minnesota differs from the other states discussed in Section II.B
because its Supreme Court accepted ASPD as a condition sufficient
for a mental abnormality before Kansas v. Crane.326 Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed this use of
ASPD in an individualized inquiry of the sex offender after Kansas v.
Crane was decided.
In In re Linehan, Dennis Darol Linehan contended that
Minnesota’s Sexually Violent Predator Act was unconstitutional.327
Linehan’s sexual offenses began in his teens. In 1956, when he was
fifteen, he pulled down the shorts of a four-year-old girl and in 1960,
when he was nineteen, he had statutorily raped one thirteen-year-old
girl and raped another girl.328 In 1965, Linehan killed a fourteen-

323. Id. at 633. Importantly, this is the language of the New York Court of
Appeals. See State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 250 (N.Y. 2014) (“A diagnosis of
ASPD alone—that is, when the ASPD diagnosis is not accompanied by a diagnosis of
any other condition, disease or disorder alleged to constitute a mental abnormality—
simply does not distinguish the sex offender whose mental abnormality subjects him
to civil commitment from the typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal
case.”).
324. In re Miller, 210 P.3d at 634 (emphasis in original).
325. Id.
326. See In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 878 (Minn. 1999) (“The district court
found that appellant clearly meets all of the prongs of the SDP Act: he has a long
history of engaging in harmful sexual behavior, he suffers from . . . antisocial
personality disorder, and he is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual
conduct in the future. Accordingly, we uphold his commitment under the SDP
Act.”).
327. Id. at 869.
328. Id.
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year-old girl while attempting to sexually assault her.329 Before he
was arrested, Linehan committed two more sexual assaults, one of
which was rape.330 Linehan was sentenced to forty years in prison,
but in 1975 he escaped and assaulted a twelve-year-old.331 He was
returned to prison five years later.332
When his prison term was coming to an end in 1992, the State of
Minnesota moved to civilly commit Linehan under the Psychopathic
Personality Commitment Act, 333 but failed because there was no
evidence that he had “utter lack of power to control (his or her)
sexual impulses.” 334
Nevertheless, Linehan remained under
“intensive supervised release.”335 In 1994, Minnesota enacted the
Sexually Dangerous Person Act and the State again moved to have
Linehan civilly committed.336 The trial court concluded after a sixtyday review hearing that Linehan was a sexually dangerous person
eligible for civil commitment.337
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Minnesota law based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v.
Hendricks because the Minnesota act “mirror[ed] the Kansas Act.”338
The Court also upheld Linehan’s civil commitment because he was
found to meet all prongs of Minnesota’s Act: “he has a long history
of engaging in harmful sexual behavior, he suffers from . . . antisocial
personality disorder, and he is highly likely to engage in acts of
harmful sexual conduct in the future.”339 Thus, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota implicitly held that ASPD was a condition sufficient for
civil commitment.

329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. MINN. STAT. §§ 526.09-10 (1992). This act was similar to the early Sexual
Psychopath Laws. See supra Section I.B.
334. This is the test that was required prior to the enactment of Minnesota’s
Sexually Violent Predator Law. See In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting State
ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Ct. of Ramsey Cty., 287 N.W. 297, 302 (Minn. 1939) aff’d, 309
U.S. 270 (1940)).
335. Id.
336. Under the new act, it was not necessary for there to be an “utter lack of power
to control” impulses. See id. at 870 (“(b) For the purposes of this provision, it is not
necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual
impulses.”) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1994) (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02.16(b) (2013))).
337. See In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d at 870.
338. Id. at 873.
339. Id. at 878.
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The Eighth Circuit reviewed Linehan’s case again in 2003. In
Linehan v. Milczark, Linehan filed a petition for habeas corpus to
seek release from civil commitment under Minnesota’s Sexually
Violent Predator Law.340 Among Linehan’s contentions was that he
was unconstitutionally confined because he was only diagnosed with
ASPD.341 Since Linehan’s petition was filed after Kansas v. Crane he
attempted to argue that, “Crane limited the kind of mental disorders
that can serve as a predicate for civil commitment to those severe in
nature, at the far end of an inability to control scale.”342 He argued,
that because forty to sixty percent of the male population could be
diagnosed with ASPD, he was not sufficiently distinguished from the
ordinary recidivist.343 The Eighth Circuit refuted this by examining
the twenty-six page initial commitment order and memorandum the
trial court filed.344 This, along with Linehan’s inability to control
himself during familial visits345 and his behavior toward hospital and
prison staff, convinced the Eighth Circuit that the Minnesota
Supreme Court had sufficient evidence beyond Linehan’s diagnosis
that he was a sexually violent predator.346 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
ruled Minnesota did not unreasonably apply the Sexually Violent
Predator Act to Linehan’s case.347

4.

Missouri: Past Sexually Violent Behavior

Missouri permits ASPD to qualify as a mental abnormality under
its Sexually Violent Predator Statute so long as there is evidence “of a
link between ASPD and sexually violent behavior.”348
Mark Murrell challenged the State of Missouri’s petition to civilly
commit him in 2000.349 One of his main contentions was that ASPD
could not suffice as a mental abnormality under Missouri’s Sexually

340. 315 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2003).
341. Id. at 928.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. (“Although the visiting time was limited, he left his wife and stepdaughter
to go masturbate after some physical play with the young girl”).
346. Id. (“It concluded that the trial court record and findings were sufficient to
distinguish Linehan from the ‘typical recidivist’ and to establish that his behavior met
the SDP Act standard for constitutional civil commitment because of the nature of
his A[S]PD, combined with his history of sexual violence”) (citing In re Linehan, 594
N.W.2d 867, 867-78 (Minn. 1999)).
347. Id. at 929.
348. Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Mo. 2007).
349. See id. at 100; see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.484(1) (2014).
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Violent Predator statute.350 Murrell’s criminal history began when he
was a teenager.351 By the time he was fifteen years old, he had
already been in two different juvenile facilities.352 When he was
eighteen, he was arrested on an aggravated battery charge.353 Three
months after he was released on that charge, he kidnapped two
women at gunpoint and raped them.354 In 1980, Murrell pled guilty to
the rape.355 He was released on parole in 1991, but it was revoked for
driving while intoxicated, unlawful use of a weapon, and possession of
a controlled substance.356 He was released again in 1995, but four
months later he pled guilty to child molestation in the second degree
for fondling the breasts of a thirteen-year-old girl.357 Murrell was
scheduled for release on April 4, 2000, but the State of Missouri filed
a petition for civil commitment on February 28, 2000.358
Before his civil commitment proceeding, a forensic psychologist
diagnosed Murrell with depressive disorder, polysubstance
dependence, and ASPD.359 The psychologist testified that his ASPD
made it more likely than not that Murrell would engage “in predatory
acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.”360 Another
psychologist opined similarly that Murrell’s ASPD predisposed him
to commit sexually violent offenses and caused him serious difficulty
in controlling his behavior. 361 Murrell’s psychologist opined
differently; he did not believe that Murrell suffered from a mental
abnormality under Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator statute
because ASPD does not necessarily cause sexual urges.362 The jury
nevertheless found Murrell to be a sexually violent predator.363
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld Murrell’s civil
commitment.364 It specifically addressed the issue of whether ASPD
can qualify as a mental abnormality and whether it can provide

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See Murrell, 215 S.W.3d at 99.
See id. at 100.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 113.
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sufficient evidence for a jury to find an offender is more likely than
not to sexually offend.365 After reviewing Kansas v. Crane, the Court
held that mental abnormality under the Sexually Violent Predator
statute need only “evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a
present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in
the future if the person is not incapacitated.”366 It is not necessary
that the mental abnormality itself predispose a person to commit
sexually violent offenses.367
The Supreme Court of Missouri conceded that a sole diagnosis of
ASPD without past sexual history would not qualify as a mental
abnormality under the statute.368 Nevertheless, it reasoned “[s]imply
because ASPD cannot in every case be enough . . . does not make it
‘too imprecise.’ If ASPD is linked with sexually violent behavior, it
can provide the basis for commitment.”369 In Murrell’s case, his
ASPD distinguished him from the typical recidivist because there was
evidence of past sexually violent behavior. 370 Thus, his mental
abnormality of ASPD made him a sexually violent predator under
Missouri’s statute.371

5.

North Dakota: Nexus Between Disorder and Future
Dangerousness

North Dakota allows the diagnosis of ASPD so long as there is a
“causal relationship or nexus between an individual’s [ASPD] and
dangerousness which establishes a likelihood of reoffending.” 372
G.R.H. appealed an order civilly committing him as a sexually
dangerous individual in North Dakota.373 In 1994, he was convicted
of gross sexual imposition374 after engaging in sexual acts with a

365. Id. at 105.
366. Id. at 106 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997)).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 107.
369. Id.
370. See id. at 108 (“Murrell has committed sex crimes in two instances, each
involving multiple acts of assault, one with multiple victims. Murrell committed the
sex crimes impulsively, with little hesitation and without thinking about the
consequences of his actions”).
371. See id. (“To borrow language from Hendricks, Murrell’s ‘lack of volitional
control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes
(Murrell) from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with
exclusively through criminal proceedings.’”) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360).
372. In re G.R.H., 711 N.W.2d 587, 594 (N.D. 2006).
373. Id. at 589.
374. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-03 (West 2015).
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victim less than fifteen years old.375 He was released from custody in
1999 but was charged with corruption or solicitation of a minor,376
delivery of alcohol to a minor, and failing to register as a sex offender
twenty days later. 377 His probation was revoked and he was
imprisoned until 2004.378
Before he was released, the State’s Attorney petitioned to have
G.R.H. civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual under
North Dakota’s Sexually Violent Predator Law.379 The trial court
found G.R.H. “engaged in sexually predatory conduct and has a
congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by an anti-social
personality disorder that makes [him] likely to engage in further acts
of sexually predatory conduct which constitutes a danger to the
physical or mental health or safety of others.”380 Thus G.R.H. was
civilly committed under North Dakota’s Sexually Violent Predator
Law.
On appeal, one of G.R.H’s main arguments was that his civil
commitment “violate[d] due process and double jeopardy provisions
of the state and federal constitutions”381 because it was based on his
diagnosis of ASPD and it ignored his ability to control his
behavior. He claimed that under Kansas v. Crane, his diagnosis of
ASPD did not distinguish him from the typical recidivist and also did
not establish a lack of ability to control his behavior.382 The North
Dakota Supreme Court rejected these arguments after evaluating
Hendricks, Crane, and the North Dakota Sexually Violent Predator
Act.383
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that Crane stated that
the sex offender must be distinguished from the typical recidivist, but
also reinforced the fact that “states have considerable leeway to
define mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an
individual eligible for involuntary civil commitment.”384 Moreover,
the Court stated that other courts that have applied Crane have
required “a nexus between a disorder and future dangerousness,

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

See In re G.R.H., 711 N.W.2d at 589.
See N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 12.1-20-05 (West 2015).
See In re G.R.H., 711 N.W.2d at 589.
See id.
See id. at 589-90; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-03(1).
In re G.R.H., 711 N.W.2d at 589-90.
Id. at 591.
See id.
See id. at 591-95.
Id. at 592 (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002)).
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which, in turn, provides proof that the individual has serious difficulty
controlling his behavior.”385 Thus, G.R.H.’s ASPD had to have a
causal relationship with his dangerousness in order for G.R.H. to be
civilly committed. The Court held that the two expert psychologists
that testified that G.R.H. suffered from a serious lack of ability to
control his behavior at trial was sufficient for the trial court to find by
clear and convincing evidence that G.R.H. was a sexually dangerous
individual.386 In doing so, the North Dakota Supreme Court accepted
ASPD as a condition sufficient for a mental abnormality under North
Dakota’s Sexually Violent Predator Law.
III. ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER SHOULD BE A
CONDITION SUFFICIENT TO CIVILLY COMMIT A SEX OFFENDER
Part III explains why there should not be a bright-line rule banning
the use of ASPD on its own as a condition sufficient to civilly commit
a sex offender. First, this Part rebuts the New York Court of
Appeals’ argument that a diagnosis of ASPD alone does not
distinguish the sex offender from the typical recidivist. This is shown
in the Supreme Court’s warning against using bright-line rules in this
specific area of law and is shown in subsequent New York decisions
that comment on the reasoning in Donald DD. It is additionally
shown in reviewing the purpose of Sexually Violent Predator Laws
and in reviewing other courts’ treatment of ASPD as a sufficient
diagnosis. Part III also argues for a totality of the circumstances, or
individualized inquiry approach when evaluating whether a sex
offender diagnosed with ASPD should be civilly committed. This is
demonstrated by an analogy to searches conducted under the Fourth
Amendment, which displays that totality of the circumstances is often
used in areas where the police powers of the state and the liberty
interests of the individual are intertwined.
A. ASPD Can Distinguish the Sex Offender from the Typical
Recidivist
The Supreme Court specifically warned against using bright-line
rules in the Kansas v. Crane. In doing so, the Supreme Court left
open the possibility that a sole diagnosis of ASPD can be sufficient to
distinguish a sex offender from a typical recidivist. This Section
reviews Kansas v. Crane and New York decisions subsequent to
Donald DD. that disagree with the case’s reasoning. These opinions
warn against excluding the sole diagnosis of ASPD from ever being
385. Id. at 592-93.
386. See id. at 595.
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sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender. Finally, this Section
explains how permitting ASPD as a condition sufficient for civil
commitment is not inconsistent with the purpose of Sexually Violent
Predator Laws and reinforces the idea that other states have already
accepted ASPD as a condition sufficient for civil commitment. Thus,
ASPD can be a condition sufficient to distinguish the sex offender
from the typical recidivist.

1.

Kansas v. Crane Leaves Open the Possibility that ASPD Can Be

a Condition Sufficient for Civil Commitment

It is true Kansas v. Crane clarified the constitutionality of Sexually
Violent Predator Laws by requiring that there be a showing of some
type of “special and serious lack of ability to control behavior.”387
Nevertheless, the Court did not define what “lack of control” means
within the context of civil commitment. It stated, “[we] did not give
the phrase ‘lack of control’ a particularly narrow or technical
meaning. And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is at
issue, ‘inability to control behavior’ will not be demonstrable by
mathematical precision.” 388 The Court further explained that it
would be enough to show there is “lack of control” if the mental
abnormality presented in the offender distinguishes him “from the
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal
case.”389 Thus, the New York Court of Appeals was correct in
delineating the issue in Donald DD. to be whether Donald DD.’s
diagnosis distinguished him from the typical recidivist.390
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continued to explain the
constitutional standard, or lack thereof, of “lack of control” in civil
commitment proceedings. It stated:
We recognize that Hendricks as so read provides a less precise
constitutional standard than would those more definite rules for
which the parties have argued. But the Constitution’s safeguards of

human liberty in the area of mental illness and the law are not
always best enforced through precise bright-line rules.391

Moreover, the Supreme Court insisted the states had “considerable
leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders

387. 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
388. Id.
389. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58
(1997)).
390. See State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 250 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting Crane, 534
U.S. at 413).
391. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added).

2017]

DONALD DD.

911

that make an individual eligible for commitment.” 392 Thus, the
Supreme Court did not specifically define which mental disorders
would qualify under the civil commitment statutes. The Court instead
suggested that no bright-line rules be developed in this area of the
law.
In fact, the respondent in Crane suffered from ASPD and another
psychological disorder, exhibitionism. 393 However, the Supreme
Court did not hold either diagnosis insufficient to civilly commit a sex
offender.394 Instead, it called for a finding that the respondent had
difficulty in controlling his behavior and remanded the case.395 The
Supreme Court therefore had the opportunity to declare ASPD
insufficient to qualify as a mental abnormality under Sexually Violent
Predator Laws—but did not.396 Thus, in declaring that ASPD can
never be sufficient under Article 10, 397 the New York Court of
Appeals toed the line of creating a bright-line rule in an area of law
where the Supreme Court specifically warned against it and where the
Supreme Court had the chance to address it.

2.

Subsequent New York Case Law Alludes that ASPD Can Be a
Condition Sufficient to Civilly Commit a Sex Offender

Subsequent decisions in New York Courts have had difficulty
reconciling Donald DD.’s interpretation that ASPD can never be a
condition sufficient to civilly commit a sex offender. In fact, a few
decisions openly disagree with the Court of Appeals’ approach.

392. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359).
393. Id. at 411 (explaining that Crane suffered from both ASPD and
exhibitionism). Exhibitionistic disorder is defined in the DSM-5 as having a “sexual
attraction to exposing . . . [one’s] genitals to unsuspecting persons.” See DSM-5,
supra note 20, at 689.
394. Crane, 541 U.S. at 413 (“For one thing, the States retain considerable leeway
in defining the mental and personality disorders that make an individual eligible for
commitment.”).
395. Id. at 412 (“We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it seeks to
claim that the Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous sex
offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination.”).
396. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Expert Testimony in Sexually Violent Predator

Commitments: Conceptualizing Legal Standards of “Mental Disorder” and “Likely
to Reoffend,” 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 471, 474 (2003) (“Although [there]

was an opportunity for the court to address whether Antisocial Personality Disorder
should be considered a qualifying diagnosis for an SVP/ADP commitment, they did
not.”).
397. See State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 249 (N.Y. 2014) (“We must interpret
the Mental Hygiene Law article 10 statute on the assumption that it accords with
these constitutional requirements.”).
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These cases indicate that a more individualized approach may be
appropriate in the civil commitment context.
In State v. Jerome A., the Supreme Court of New York County
openly disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ argument that a sole
diagnosis of ASPD does not distinguish the sex offender from the
typical recidivist.398 In that case, Respondent Jerome A. contended
that his diagnosis of “ASPD with psychopathy” was insufficient as a
mental abnormality under Article 10 and cited Donald DD. for that
proposition.399 Although the New York Supreme Court ultimately
dismissed the petition for civil commitment, the Court disagreed with
Donald DD.’s reasoning that ASPD alone is not a sufficient mental
abnormality under Article 10. It reasoned:
Simply because most prison inmates can be diagnosed with ASPD
does not mean most prison inmates could also be subject to Article
10 . . . the vast majority of convicted offenders who have been
diagnosed with ASPD are not even statutorily eligible for civil
management. Of those who are eligible a much smaller fraction
prior to Donald DD. had become subject to Article 10 and still a
smaller percentage had been found to have a Mental
Abnormality.400

The Court ultimately concluded that “as a factual matter” a sole
diagnosis of ASPD can “predispose a small minority of offenders with
that diagnosis to commit sex offenses and result in serious difficulty in
controlling such conduct.”401
The Supreme Court of New York County articulated this
disagreement again in State v. Gary K.402 In that case, the Court
debunked two arguments frequently cited after Donald DD. was
decided: “The Argument That ASPD Is Invalid Because of Its
Prevalence in the Prison Population” and “The Notion that ASPD

Plus Some Other Condition Would Be Valid Because an Offender is
Diagnosed With More Than One Disorder.”403 The Court debunked

the former argument in stating that “numerical comparisons,” are a
“poor basis” to decide whether an individual should be subject to civil
commitment.404 It argued that virtually any disorder, then, could be
398. See generally State v. Jerome A., No. 30261-2014, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
3243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
399. See id. at *2.
400. Id. at *17.
401. See id. at *19-20.
402. See State v. Gary K., No. 30140/16, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3688, at *23-26
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).
403. See id. at *42-43 (alteration in original).
404. Id.
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looked at on the basis of how it affects the prison population.405 In
essence, the Court stated that just because a certain percentage of the
population is diagnosed with the disorder does not mean that
diagnosis should disqualify any one individual from civil
commitment.406
The Court then debunked the latter argument by stating,
“offenders who have been diagnosed with ASPD alone have
committed repeated horrific sex crimes.”407 In doing so, the Court
suggested that the number of diagnoses the individual has should
have no bearing on whether or not the individual should be civilly
committed.408 Moreover, the Court implied that ASPD alone may be
sufficient to civilly confine a sex offender, since offenders with ASPD
alone have the capacity to commit “repeated horrific sex crimes.”

3. Permitting ASPD as a Condition Sufficient to Civilly Commit
Sexual Offenders is Not Contrary to the Purpose of Sexually Violent
Predator Laws
Although the sole diagnosis of ASPD “means little more than a
deep-seated tendency to commit crimes,”409 a person cannot be civilly
committed under Sexually Violent Predator Laws unless they have a
history of sexually offending.410 Thus, it is not inconsistent that a
person who is diagnosed with ASPD and who has a record of
engaging in “nonconsensual sex without forethought or consideration
of consequences, and being indifferent to the rights and feelings of
others in their sexual acts”411 meets the criteria for civil commitment.
If the fact finder can determine that a person who has committed past

405. See id. at *43 (“[I]t would appear that the percentage of the prison population
who could be diagnosed with some kind of substance or alcohol use disorder might
equal or exceed the percentage who could be diagnosed with ASPD”).
406. See id. (“It is difficult to understand why due-process would preclude lifetime
confinement for conditions which, for example, 65% of prison inmates had but allow
it for disorders which 40% of prisoners had.”)
407. Id. at *44.
408. Id. at *44-45.
409. State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 250 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting State v.
Shannon S., 10 N.Y.3d 99, 110 (N.Y. 2008) (Smith, J., dissenting)).
410. Gregory DeClue, Paraphilia NOS (Nonconsenting) and Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 495, 499 (2000) (“No person who meets criteria for
antisocial personality disorder but has never committed a sexually violent
act . . . meets criteria for civil commitment as sexually violent predator.”); see also
Miller, supra note 125, at 2098 (stating that most states define sexually violent
predator as a person “(1) who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually
violent offense and (2) who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
(3) that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.”).
411. See DeClue, supra note 410, at 500.
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sexual acts is a danger to society, then commitment is consistent with
the purpose of Sexually Violent Predator Laws.412
Moreover, as presented in Part II of this Note, other jurisdictions
have held that ASPD is a condition sufficient in distinguishing the sex
offender from the typical recidivist.413 These jurisdictions tend to
recognize the argument that a high percentage of the prison
population is diagnosed with ASPD414 and that it is not a sexual
disorder. 415
Nevertheless, these jurisdictions hold that an
individualized inquiry, or totality of the circumstances approach, is
the optimal way to determine if the sex offender requires civil
commitment.416
B.

Balancing Liberty Interests and the Police Powers of the State:
An Analogy to Fourth Amendment Searches

Similarly to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution417 works in striking a

412. Id. at 499-500 (“[I]n those states that use ‘mental abnormality or personality
disorder’ to describe the qualifying condition, I see nothing conceptually inconsistent
with using a diagnosis of [ASPD] as one—or the sole—qualifying disorder. On a
case-by-case basis, some people who show a pervasive pattern of violating the rights
of others, repeatedly performing sexual acts that are grounds for arrest . . . may meet
the criteria for civil commitment as sexually violent predators.”). The holdings of
Frank P. and Donald DD. are enough to make one pause. Frank P. was convicted
and imprisoned twice for sexual crimes before he was evaluated to be civilly
committed. See State v. Frank P., 2 N.Y.S.3d 483, 152-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
Likewise, Donald DD. was imprisoned three times, twice for sexual crimes, before he
was evaluated to be civilly committed. See Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d at 244. Both
offenders were ineligible for civil commitment because they were only diagnosed
with ASPD.
413. See supra Section II.B.
414. See Linehan v. Milczark, 315 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2003); In re Det. of
Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Iowa 2004).
415. In re Miller, 210 P.3d 634 (Kan. 2009).
416. See In re Barnes, 689 N.W.2d at 456 (“We think this individualized inquiry
comports with the requirements of due process because it ultimately serves to limit
civil commitment to dangerous sexual offenders. At the same time, it protects those
persons inflicted with antisocial personality disorder who are not predisposed to
commit sexual offenses from commitment.”); In re Miller, 210 P.3d at 634 (“[The
statute] provides for the commitment of a sex offender with any mental
abnormality . . . that makes him or her more likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual
violence . . . .”) (emphasis added); Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 107 (Mo. 2007)
(“[s]imply because ASPD cannot in every case be enough, however, does not make it
‘too imprecise.’ If ASPD is linked with sexually violent behavior, it can provide the
basis for commitment.”).
417. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
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balance between a constitutional right and the state’s police
powers.418 In the case of a Fourth Amendment search, the balance is
between “[i]ndividual liberty and the right to be free from
government intrusion . . . [and] the government’s ability to ferret out
criminals and to prevent crime.” 419 In the case of the Sexually
Violent Predator Laws, “the state has the right to write statutes for
the benefit of society at large, even when providing this benefit may
come at the cost of restricting the liberties of certain individuals.”420
Thus, a review of how courts evaluate Fourth Amendment searches
may provide insight as to how courts should evaluate respondents
under Sexually Violent Predator Laws.
The Supreme Court, in Fourth Amendment search cases, has
adopted a “totality of the circumstances” approach.421 Illinois v.
Gates was a case specifically about a magistrate’s issuance of a search
warrant “on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous
informant’s tip.”422 The Court reasoned that the “totality of the
circumstance approach” was the optimal way to “achieve the
accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth
Amendment requires than . . . [the rigid two-pronged test
approach]423 . . . that has developed in Aguilar and Spinelli.”424 In
Gates, the Supreme Court reasoned that this was an area of law that
needed a more flexible approach to evaluate whether or not an
unreasonable search had occurred.425

Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
418. Daniel S. Jonas, Pretext Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1791 (1989) (“Within the
fourth amendment resides a tension between the privacy rights of individuals and the
ability of the police power to enforce the law.”).
419. Id.
420. Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31.
421. See Kin Kinports, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: Totality Tests
or Rigid Rules?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014), http://www.pennlaw
review.com/online/163-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-75.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2HW-7DHZ]
(“Since its decision more than thirty years ago in Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that the Fourth Amendment’s suspicion requirements—the probable
cause required to arrest and search, the reasonable suspicion needed to stop and
frisk—are totality-of-the-circumstances tests.”).
422. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217 (1983).
423. Id. at 230 (“We agree [that] . . . an informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and
‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We
do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely
separated and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case . . . .”).
424. Id. at 239.
425. Id.
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A more flexible approach is also warranted in the civil commitment
context. This scenario is similar to the Fourth Amendment setting:
the balance must be between a person’s liberty interest and the
government’s duty to protect the welfare of citizens from dangerous
recidivistic sex offenders. 426 As mentioned in Sections I.C and
III.A.1, the Supreme Court specifically warned against a bright-line
rule in this area of law.427 Moreover, as other jurisdictions have
noted, the individualized inquiry still serves to eliminate those who
are not predisposed to sexually offending428 and that just because a
sex offender convicted of ASPD may require civil commitment in one
case does not mean a sex offender will require civil commitment in
another.429 Thus, a totality of the circumstances—or individualized—
approach may be the optimal way to achieve the balance of the public
and private interests at stake in civil commitment proceedings, just as
it has been determined to be the optimal way to achieve the balance
of public and private interests at stake in the Fourth Amendment
context.
CONCLUSION
Antisocial personality disorder should be permitted as a condition
sufficient to civilly confine a sex offender under Sexually Violent
Predator Laws. Sexually Violent Predator Laws were enacted to
capture those sexually violent offenders that suffer from mental
abnormalities and continue to pose a danger to society. 430 The
Supreme Court has ruled that in order for these statutes to be
constitutional, they must apply to those who lack an ability to control
their sexually violent behavior, distinguishing those individuals from
the typical criminal recidivist.431 Although ASPD “means little more
than a deep-seated tendency to commit crimes,” 432 the Supreme
Court cautioned against using bright-line rules in this area of law.433
Subsequent New York decisions question the bright-line reasoning in
Donald DD., and other jurisdictions have permitted the use of ASPD
as a condition sufficient to qualify as a mental abnormality under
426. See Testa & West, supra note 57, at 31.
427. See supra Sections I.C, III.A; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
428. See In re Det. of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Iowa 2004).
429. See In re Miller, 210 P.3d 634, 634 (Kan. 2009).
430. See supra Section I.C.
431. See supra Section I.C.
432. State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 250 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting State v.
Shannon S., 10 N.Y.3d 99, 110 (N.Y. 2008) (Smith, J., dissenting)); see supra Section
II.A.
433. See supra Part III.
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Sexually Violent Predator Laws. 434 By allowing ASPD to be a
condition sufficient for civil commitment, an individualized inquiry
should be used to see whether a particular sex offender is prone to
reoffend based on his ASPD diagnosis. In this way, courts will be
able to thoroughly evaluate which sex offenders require civil
commitment, without barring an entire class of offenders that have
the same capability to pose a danger to society just because they are
diagnosed with ASPD.

434. See supra Section III.A.2.

